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Last September, in defense of the Constitution, Bob Schulz
sued Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Fed. Chairman Ben Bernanke to prevent the flow of public
funds to AIG until they identified where in the
Constitution they found the authority, granted by
the People, to give or lend public funds or credit
to a private party for a decidedly and definitively
private purpose. |
Soon after, also in defense of the Constitution, Bob Schulz
sued the leaders of the U.S. Executive and
Legislative Branches and Fed. Chairman Ben Bernanke,
to prevent the flow of public funds under the $700
Billion Bailout Bill (The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008) until they identified
where in the Constitution they found the authority,
granted by the People, to give or lend public funds
or credit to a private party for a decidedly and
definitively private purpose.
Despite the fact the bailout legislation passed into law
expressly provides for Judicial consideration of
injunctions brought on constitutional grounds, the federal District Court dismissed the case on the
basis
that Schulz lacked “standing” to bring the
constitutional challenge and, therefore, the Court
lacked “jurisdiction” to hear the case.
Yesterday, Schulz perfected his appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Manhattan. His
Argument is repeated, below in its entirety. For a
full copy of his Brief, including the Facts and
Procedural History,
click here.
In sum, Schulz argues that the decisions by the federal
Courts, in cases (Petitions) seeking Redress of
direct violations of the Constitution by officials
in the two other branches of the federal Government,
have put Schulz (and all other individuals) in the
intolerable position of having to rely exclusively
on the electoral process (i.e., the majority of
people voting) for a guarantee of his Rights, not
the Constitution or the Courts.
ARGUMENT:
A. THE JUDICIARY’S APPLICATION OF ITS STANDING
DOCTRINE, COUPLED WITH THE JUDICIARY’S
APPLICATION OF ITS STARE DECISIS
DOCTRINE,
IN A STRING OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
ACTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT, ADDS UP TO AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, INTOLERABLE DEPRIVATION
OF PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT TO A GOVERNMENT
REPUBLICAN IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE.
In 1997, this Court dismissed another constitutional
challenge by Plaintiff Schulz for lack of standing.
Schulz
claimed Defendants in that case, President Clinton
and Treasury Secretary Robert Rueben had acted
ultra vires and without authority in agreeing to
bail out the Mexican Peso with $20 billion of public
funds. Schulz charged Defendants were
usurping the powers granted to Congress under the
Money clauses of the Constitution, in violation of
his individual, unalienable Right to an Executive
Branch limited by a written Constitution, i.e., an
Executive that does not act arbitrarily by
exercising power not granted to it. Plaintiff sought
to prevent the transfer of public funds to Mexico by
the Executive Branch pending a resolution of the
underlying constitutional question.
In 2000, this Court dismissed another constitutional
challenge by Schulz for lack of standing.
Schulz claimed
Defendants in that case, President Clinton and
Defense Secretary William Cohn had acted ultra
vires to bomb the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Schulz charged Defendants were usurping
the powers granted to Congress under the War Powers
clauses of the Constitution, in violation of his
individual, unalienable Right to an Executive Branch
limited by a written Constitution, i.e., an
Executive that does not act arbitrarily by
exercising power not granted to it. Plaintiff sought
to prevent any further application of the armed
forces of the United States in hostilities in
Yugoslavia or elsewhere overseas pending a
resolution of the underlying constitutional
question.
Having determined the policy of the Judicial Branch
of the Government was not to honor the First
Amendment guarantee of the Creator-endowed Right of
American citizens to hold the Government accountable
to the Constitution by Petitioning the Government
for Redress of its violations, Schulz then began to
Petition his elected representatives in the
Legislative and Executive Branches for Redress of
numerous other violations of the Constitution.
Between 1999 and 2004, Schulz served fact-based
First Amendment Petitions for Redress of Grievances
relating to those violations of the Constitution on
his members of Congress and the President. Each
Petition for Redress sought relief from a specific
act of the Government alleged to be in violation of
a specific restriction, prohibition or mandate of
the Constitution (the Iraq Resolution and the War
Powers clause, Federal Reserve System and the Money
clauses, the U.S.A. Patriot Act and its violation of
the Privacy clauses, and federal income tax system
and its violation of the Tax clauses). However, the
officials of each of the two non-judicial branches
refused to respond to any of the Petitions
for Redress – i.e., they refused, and continue to
refuse to be held accountable. They refused, and
continue to refuse to justify their behavior.
In 2004, Schulz returned to the Judicial Branch with
an action for declaratory relief, seeking a
declaration of his Rights and the obligations of the
Government under the accountability clause of the
First Amendment – the last ten words.
Schulz asked the Court to answer two questions: 1)
Is the Government obligated to respond to Petitions
for Redress of constitutional
violations?; and 2) If the Government does not
respond do the People have a Right to withdraw their
support and resources until their Grievances are
Redressed? Citing two cases decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1979 and 1984, the
Court grotesquely misapplied the judicial doctrine
of stare decisis to arrive at its ruling that
the Government is not obligated to respond to
Petitions for Redress of violations of the
Constitution and that, therefore, the People possess
no Right to withdraw their support from the
Government until their Grievances were Redressed.
In effect, by its combined actions, the Judicial,
Legislative and Executive branches have adopted a
self-serving, patently unjustifiable policy that if
a citizen(s) directly suffers, or has evidence, that
a government official(s) has violated any of the
restrictions, prohibitions or mandates of the
Constitution (such as the faithfully execute clause
of Article 2, or the war, tax and money clauses of
Article 1) or any of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights (such as the privacy clauses of the Fourth
Amendment, or the accountability clause of the First
Amendment, or the well regulated militia clause of
the Second Amendment), the citizen must rely
exclusively on the electoral process for relief.
That is, the Government, in its collective, has
effectively held that citizens who have endured
infringements of their Individual Rights, must rely
on one more than half the number of people voting in
the polling places or one more than half the number
of people voting in the halls of Congress to secure
and enjoy those Rights.
This presents an interesting dilemma for a
government allegedly constructed upon the Principle
of the recognition of the sanctity of unalienable
Individual Rights and the Rule of Law. It suggests
that those running the three branches of the
Republic have unilaterally chosen amongst
themselves, to transition America from a
Constitutional Republic to a pure Democracy, freely
ignoring the mandated procedure articulated in
Article 5 of the Constitution.
Should this Court affirm the District Court’s
decision to dismiss this case for lack of standing,
without reaching the merits of Plaintiff’s claims
the Court will be affirming the arguably dangerous
notion that if citizens object to the fact that
their elected officials violate the Constitution or
their Individual Rights, they have NO means to
secure Justice or Liberty other than to register to
vote at the next election.
B. THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION
The Lead and Member cases arise under the
Constitution of the United States of America.
Schulz cited the District Court’s
jurisdiction to declare the constitutionality of the
challenged behavior as Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution, which reads in relevant part: “The
judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States….”
Schulz also cited the District
Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331.
Schulz also cited the District Court’s jurisdiction
to entertain his Show Cause Orders for injunctive
relief – i.e., the District Court’s rules L.R.
7.1(e) and (f).
Relevant to both the lead and member cases, because
it is common knowledge that Defendants have been
giving money to AIG and numerous other privately
owned entities from the $700 billion bailout fund,
Section 119(a)(2)(A) of the final Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 authorizes injunctions
for violations of the Constitution:
“INJUNCTION.- No injunction or other form of
equitable relief shall be issued against the
Secretary for actions pursuant to section 101,
102, 106, and 109, other than to remedy a
violation of the Constitution.”
The Act directs Courts to expedite requests for
Preliminary Injunctions. EESA, Section 119(a)(2)(C).
The Act directs Courts to expedite requests for
Permanent Injunctions and wherever possible to
consolidate trial on the merits with any hearing on
a request for a preliminary injunction. EESA Section
119(a)(2)(C).
The Act provides for an automatic stay of any
injunction for 3 days. EESA Section 119(a)(2)(D).
Notwithstanding the above, the Court erroneously
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court erroneously overlooked the fact that
Schulz is a “natural born citizen” of the United
States of America. Both of Schulz’s parents and his
maternal and paternal grandparents were citizens of
the United States for their entire lifetimes, and
Schulz was born on U.S. soil in Queens, New York.
Schulz will live the duration of his life while the
Constitution of the United States of America is
expected to be in full force and effect.
The Constitution is a set of principles to govern
the Government. It is all that stands between
Schulz, a free person, and total tyranny and
despotism.
While Schulz can do anything he wants to do as long
as (constitutional) law does not prohibit it,
Defendants, on the other hand, can only do what the
Constitution authorizes them to do, and if it is not
in writing, they can’t do it, period.
“Subject matter of complaint which plainly sets
forth a case arising under Federal Constitution is
within federal judicial power defined in Article
III, § 2, of Federal Constitution, and so within
power of Congress to assign to jurisdiction of
District Courts.” Baker v Carr
(1962) 369 US 186, 7 L Ed 2d 663, 82 S Ct 691.
The primary role of the judiciary is to exercise its
jurisdiction to keep the other two branches in their
constitutional places, regardless of the level of
practical difficulty:
“Existence of jurisdiction implied duty to
exercise it, and that its exercise might be
onerous did not militate against that
implication.” Second Employers' Liability
Cases (1912) 223 US 1, 56 L Ed 327, 32 S
Ct 169.
28 USCS § 1331 provides District Courts with
jurisdiction over motions for injunctive relief and
power to review decisions and actions of federal
agencies. Parkview Corp. v Department of Army,
Corps of Engineers, etc. (1980, ED Wis) 490
F Supp 1278, 14 Envt Rep Cas 2115.
With respect to the AIG case, the Executive
Department is not authorized, with or without the
approval of Congress (Congress is not authorized to
give approval), to participate in commerce by
gifting or lending public funds and credit to a
private party for a definitively private purpose.
This is true, regardless of any noble intent of the
program or any contrived benefit the Government may
accrue as an outcome of such transactions (e.g.,
partial ownership of a bank or auto manufacturer).
The Court’s attention is invited to the fact that,
even if Congress had such power under Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution (which it does not
have) the Executive Branch did not seek and has
still not obtained the approval of Congress for
the required appropriation of public funds for such
an expenditure or to enter into the initial $85
billion Agreement with AIG.
With respect to the $700 Billion case, any act of
Congress, such as EESA, that is repugnant to the
Constitution is null and void. Marbury v Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 139 (1803).
In addition, the Executive Department is not
authorized by the Constitution, with or without the
approval of Congress, to participate in
commerce as a purchaser or insurer of real and
personal property (mortgage related assets or
otherwise) from private, for-profit entities for
decidedly private purposes. This is true,
regardless of any noble intent or perceived public
benefit of such program. Large sums of public funds
are being used to purchase, insure, or otherwise
indemnify the real and personal property, financial
investments or contracts of private entities for
decidedly private purposes.
Appellant has raised serious questions going to the
merits to establish fair grounds for litigation.
The Constitution must be construed in its entirety.
There is no provision of the Constitution that
permits or grants the Government of the United
States of America the power to participate in
commerce, i.e., to set prices and be a market
participant, by giving or lending public funds and
credit to a private party - even if such transaction
results in an exchange for warrants, financial
interest, and/or control of the private party,
especially if such transaction is for a decidedly,
definitively, private purpose.
Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of
the United States of America, the People have given
Congress the power, “To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.”
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the
United States of America gives Congress the power to
regulate commerce, not to participate in
commerce as a giver or lender of public money and
credit to private, for-profit entities.
The First Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States of America reads in part,
“Congress shall make no law…abridging … the
Right of the People peaceably to Assemble and to
Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances.”
This lawsuit is a Petition for Redress (remedy) of a
Constitutional tort. No act of Congress can, in
equity or in law, bar the judiciary from its
Constitutional duty in determining the merits of
Plaintiff’s complaint and granting the requested
relief.
Plaintiff’s Liberty depends upon his vigilance and
ability to defend against any act or threat by
Defendants to diminish the value of his Liberty.
The Ninth Amendment reads, “The
enumeration in the Constitution of certain Rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the People.”
Plaintiff claims and is exercising his natural Right to
challenge Defendants’ cooperative decision to deny
Plaintiff his constitutional Right to
constitutional governance carried out in decency and
good order and to a Government that does not act
without the consent of the governed.
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States of America reads, “The powers
not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
People.”
The power to give or lend A.I.G. or any other private
entity public money and public credit is clearly
reserved to the People, who have not expressly
transferred that power to Defendants via the
Constitution. The Agreement reached between
Defendants and A.I.G. is a usurpation of the
inherent power and vital interests of the free
People of the United States of America. Plaintiff's
claims are aggravated further still by the strong
certainty that public monies are being used to
purchase or insure significant amounts of foreign
owned impaired assets or counterparty
obligations by the U.S. Treasury.
Plaintiff, as a free person and citizen of the United
States, has a Fundamental Right to know that no
official of the United States is acting without
bona fide constitutional authority.
The Supreme Court of the United States and
the Founder’s opinions are clear: no department of
the Government can violate Fundamental Rights
possessed by Schulz, not even Congress.
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
the Supreme Court said:
“And the Constitution itself is in every real sense a law-the
lawmakers being the people themselves, in whom
under our system all political power and
sovereignty primarily resides, and through whom
such power and sovereignty primarily speaks. It is
by that law, and not otherwise, that the
legislative, executive, and judicial agencies
which it created exercise such political authority
as they have been permitted to possess. The
Constitution speaks for itself in terms so plain
that to misunderstand their import is not
rationally possible. 'We the People of the United
States,' it says, 'do ordain and establish this
Constitution.' Ordain and establish! These are
definite words of enactment, and without more
would stamp what follows with the dignity and
character of law. The framers of the Constitution,
however, were not content to let the matter rest
here, but provided explicitly-'This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.' (Const. art. 6, cl. 2.)
The supremacy of the Constitution as law is thus
declared without qualification. That supremacy is
absolute; the supremacy of a statute enacted by
Congress is not absolute but conditioned upon its
being made in pursuance of the Constitution. And a
judicial tribunal, clothed by that instrument with
complete judicial power, and, therefore, by the
very nature of the power, required to ascertain
and apply the law to the facts in every case or
proceeding properly brought for adjudication, must
apply the supreme law and reject the inferior
statute [298 U.S. 238,
297] whenever the two conflict. In the
discharge of that duty, the opinion of the
lawmakers that a statute passed by them is valid
must be given great weight, Adkins v.
Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525, 544 , 43 S.Ct. 394, 24 A.L.R.
1238; but their opinion, or the court's opinion,
that the statute will prove greatly or generally
beneficial is wholly irrelevant to the inquiry.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 549 , 550 S., 55 S.Ct. 837, 97
A.L.R. 947.” Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
In Miranda v Arizona, the Supreme Court said:
“Where rights secured by the Constitution are
involved, there can be no rule making or
legislation which would abrogate them”.
Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966)
In Federalist 78, Hamilton wrote:
“There is no position which depends on clearer
principles, than that every act of a delegated
authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission
under which it is exercised, is void. No
legislative act, therefore, contrary to the
Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, would be
to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his
principal; that the servant is above his master;
that the representatives of the people are
superior to the people themselves; that men acting
by virtue of powers, may do not only what their
powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.
“If it be said that the legislative body are
themselves the constitutional judges of their own
powers, and that the construction they put upon
them is conclusive upon the other departments, it
may be answered, that this cannot be the natural
presumption, where it is not to be collected from
any particular provisions in the Constitution. It
is not otherwise to be supposed, that the
Constitution could intend to enable the
representatives of the people to substitute their
WILL to that of their constituents. It is far more
rational to suppose, that the courts were designed
to be an intermediate body between the people and
the legislature, in order, among other things, to
keep the latter within the limits assigned to
their authority. The interpretation of the laws is
the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by
the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well
as the meaning of any particular act proceeding
from the legislative body. If there should happen
to be an irreconcilable variance between the two,
that which has the superior obligation and
validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in
other words, the Constitution ought to be
preferred to the statute, the intention of the
people to the intention of their agents.
“Nor does this
conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of
the judicial to the legislative power. It only
supposes that the power of the people is superior
to both; and that where the will of the
legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in
opposition to that of the people, declared in the
Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by
the latter rather than the former. They ought to
regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws,
rather than by those which are not fundamental.”
Hamilton, Federalist No. 78
Lacking any court ruling declaring the full contours
of the meaning of the Petition Clause as it applies
to ordinary natural citizens seeking Redress against
their Government for constitutional torts, and
taking into account the plain language of and the
Framers’ intent behind the words of the Petition
Clause, as well as the 791 years of history
documenting the evolution of Liberty from Runnymede
to Philadelphia, and the complete absence of any
case law in opposition to Plaintiff’s interpretation
of the Constitution, the ends of Justice and
Liberty require that deference, and the presumption
that those fundamental Rights exist as argued by
Plaintiff must be secured for Plaintiff who, by this
Petition, has claimed and is exercising those
Rights.
The individual’s Right, through the Petition Clause of
the First Amendment, to hold any branch of the
government accountable to the Constitution, is the
“capstone” Right, the period at the end of the
sentence on Liberty’s evolution, for “law without
it, is law without justice.”
Let the Government and other Defendants come
forth to present evidence of their Constitutional
and statutory authority to engage in these
transactions. They have refused to do so.
The loss of U.S. Constitutional freedoms, even for
minimal periods of time, constitutes irreparable
injury. Plaintiff has a fundamental Right to
constitutional governance carried out in decency and
good order. Plaintiff has a fundamental Right to a
government that does not violate the Constitution.
Plaintiff has a fundamental Right to hold the
Government accountable to the Constitution.
Impairment of constitutional Rights can
undoubtedly constitute irreparable injury. See
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547,
96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976) (plurality opinion).”
Time Warner v. Bloomberg, 118 F.3d 917, 924
(2d Cir. 1997).
Schulz has standing to bring suit – his
constitutional, fundamental Right to Government
officials who abide by the spirit and the letter of
the Constitution has been violated. Clearly and
demonstrably, Schulz has been injured. The Court
has jurisdiction even before the conspiracy has
resulted in economic or “tangible” injury, as
has been and will be the situation with a
continuation of Defendants’ exercise of (alleged)
“authority” under EESA. See
LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir.,
1995).
Violations of U.S. Constitutional Rights are
commonly considered irreparable injuries for the
purposes of injunctions. See Bery v. City of New
York, 97 F.3d 689, (2d Cir., 1996).
The Court has jurisdiction. Schulz’s primary injury
is due to Defendants’ encroachment on the zone of
interests protected by the Constitution.
The zone of constitutional interests being defended
by Plaintiff Schulz includes the preservation,
protection and enhancement of self-government, due
process, popular sovereignty, accountability in
government, the Right to Petition Government for a
Redress of constitutional torts, and the Right to
Constitutional governance carried out in decency and
good order.
This nation’s founding documents are comprised of
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution
of the United States of America. They are
inextricably intertwined.
The Declaration of Independence is the nation’s
“Charter,” with its essential principles, including:
"[A]ll men…are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights...That to secure these
Rights, Governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed….”
Schulz’s Rights to self-government, due process,
popular sovereignty, accountability in government,
the Right to Petition Government for a Redress of
constitutional torts, and the Right to
Constitutional governance carried out in decency and
good order come from his Creator, not the state. He
has them and is to enjoy them simply because he is
alive.
The Preamble of the Constitution of the United
States of America reads:
“WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in order to
form a more perfect Union, establish Justice,
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.”
The District Court’s implied doctrine of
non-resistance by Schulz (and the rest of “We the
People”) to arbitrary power and oppression by the
political branches of the federal Government,
apparently based on some manufactured notion of a
lack of judicial jurisdiction to hear cases and
controversies dealing with the Government’s
violation of the Constitution is absurd, slavish and
destructive of good and happiness of mankind.
Defendants argued in their Reply below that a
constitutional challenge by taxpayers, “very similar
to the one at bar” had recently been dismissed for
lack of standing: Henry Builders, Inc. et al. v.
United States et al., 1:09-cv-0299 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 26, 2009).
Defendants’ reliance on Henry Builders is
misplaced. The cases are not similar. The principle
of law Plaintiff relies on in the instant case was
not relied on by the parties or by the Court in
Henry Builders. In addition, Schulz is not
acting in his capacity as a “taxpayer.” He is acting
in his capacity as sovereign citizen who expects to
live the rest of his life alongside elected
officials who are chained and bound down by the Rule
of Law – the Constitution – not under the Rule of
Man, Whim or the will of any Majority.
In Henry Builders, as Judge Vitaliano stated
on page 2 of his decision, Plaintiffs argued that
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,
“violates the Constitution’s guarantee of equal
protection because plaintiffs … who, in common with
the whole of the population and millions of the
nation’s businesses, are not financial institutions
– are ineligible for relief under the Act’s
provisions. In sum, plaintiffs charge that TARP is
the equivalent of a financial ‘bridge to nowhere’
and that they are aggrieved because Congress did not
build one for them too.”
Here, Schulz claims no interest as a potential
recipient of the “pirated bounty” of the public fisc
obtained via TARP, etc. but has instead, clearly
charged Government defendants acted ultra vires
in adopting the EESA statute itself, that
is, the use of public money for such purposes is
entirely without any constitutional authority
whatsoever. In effect, Schulz has charged defendants
with arrogating and usurping power from the People –
that is, oppressing the People by acting arbitrarily
and capriciously.
Quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Cuno, 547
U.S. at 345 (2006), Judge Vitaliano dismissed
Henry Builders in part because Plaintiffs were
seeking to invade “policy judgment[s] committed to
the broad and legitimate discretion of lawmakers,
which the courts cannot presume either to control or
to predict.” Henry Builders at page 3.
(plaintiff’s emphasis).
Here, unlike Henry Builders, Schulz has
charged Congress acted ultra vires – that is,
illegitimately. Again, TARP, AIG, etc. are
not questions of public “policy” – they are
outside the constitutional jurisdiction of the
Law.
In addition, quoting Lance v Coffman, 549
U.S. at 439 (2007), Judge Vitaliano dismissed
Henry Builders in part because Plaintiffs
raised, “only a generally available grievance about
government – claiming only harm to [their] and every
citizen’s interest in proper application of the
Constitution and laws….” Henry Builders at
page 3-4.
Here, unlike Henry Builders, Schulz’s
challenge is not directed at whether some provision
of the Constitution or laws has been improperly
applied. His claim is that the Defendants acted
without any lawful authority whatsoever – that is,
that the Constitution was ignored altogether.
Thus far, Defendants have utterly failed to cite
their authority to give or lend public money to
private corporations for decidedly and definitively
private purposes. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for
lack of standing must be denied.
Schulz has suffered an actual injury in fact. The
AIG Agreement and EESA are invasions of legally
protected-constitutional- interests. Schulz’s
injuries, although shared with many others, are as
particularized and concrete as any injury can ever
be – that is, loss of his natural, individual,
unalienable Right of sovereignty and
self-government, and loss of his Grand Right to
government based on the consent of the governed.
Schulz’s injuries are clearly traceable to the AIG
Agreement and to EESA. Only a favorable decision by
the Court will remedy his injuries.
To dismiss this case on a theory of lack of standing
would be to effectively hold that, despite the fact
that all those who comprise the class of humans
referred to by the first three words of the
Constitution may suffer equal injuries and
deprivations of Liberty (See, “We the
People”), the Judiciary itself is simply no longer
available as a means of securing Redress to cure or
restrain the unlawful acts of the (servant)
government they created.
Let us pray this has not become the fate of our nation.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully requests an order reversing
the District Court’s decision, requiring Defendants
to cite their authority to engage in the challenged
acts, and granting Plaintiff’s application for
Preliminary injunctive relief. Thus far, Defendants
have utterly failed to cite their authority to give
or lend public money to privately-owned
corporations for decidedly, and definitively,
private purposes.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In keeping with Rule 28 and 32, this Brief contains
6925 words, including footnotes.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: May 11, 2009
ROBERT L. SCHULZ, pro se
2458 Ridge Road
Queensbury, NY 12804
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