We the People foundation
for constitutional education, Inc.
2008 NH Primary
Reliability of Vote Counting:
Machine v. People
Robert Schulz
We The People Foundation
2/22/2008
New Hampshire’s vote counting machines violate federal
accuracy standards. New Hampshire’s machines experienced
an error rate approximately 163 times greater than the
error rate allowed under federal Election Law. In
addition, the number of machine counts that were in error
by more than 2 votes was 9.81 times greater than the
number of hand counts that were off by more than 2 votes.
The number of machine counts that were in error by more
than 1 vote was 3.37 times greater than the number of hand
counts that were off by more than 1 vote.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TABLE OF CONTENTS |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TABLE OF CONTENTS |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
INTRODUCTION |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RECOUNT PROCEDURE |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
STATE’S ORIGINAL AND RECOUNT VOTE TOTALS |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OUR ASSUMPTIONS |
|
|
|
|
A. Hand v Machine Count Precincts |
|
|
|
|
B. Write-Ins |
|
|
|
|
C. “Double Zeros” |
|
|
|
|
D. Machine Failures and LHS Service Reports |
|
|
|
|
E. Fraud |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Confusion and Frustration: Missing Memory Cards,
Uncast Ballots, Chain of Custody and Voter Registration |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OUR FINDINGS |
|
|
|
|
A. NH Machine Error Rates Violate Federal Law By A Wide
Margin |
|
|
|
|
B. Hand Counting Virtually Assures All Votes Will Be
Accurately Counted |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TABLES
Note:
Right-Click to open
a table in new Window
|
|
|
|
|
Table 1
Error Rates, All Ballots Included In Recount |
|
|
|
|
Table 2
Error Rates, All Republican Ballots Included in Recount |
|
|
|
|
Table
3 Error Rates, All Democrat Ballots Included in
Recount |
|
|
|
|
Table 4 Official
Results: Full Statewide Republican Recount |
|
|
|
|
Table 5 Official
Results: Partial Democrat Recount |
|
|
|
|
Table 6
Uncounted Votes For Republicans By Democrats |
|
|
|
|
Table 7
Republican Ballots: Size and Frequency of Errors
|
|
|
|
|
Table 8
Republican Ballots: Size and Frequency of Errors > 1 |
|
|
|
|
Table 9
Republican Ballots: Size and Frequency of Errors > 2
|
|
|
|
|
Table 10 Democrat Ballots: Size and Frequency of
Errors |
|
|
|
|
Table 11 All
Ballots: Size and Frequency of Errors |
|
|
|
|
Table 12
Republican Ballots: Error Size Statistics |
|
|
|
|
Table
13 Democrat Ballots: Error Size Statistics
|
|
|
|
|
Table 14
All Ballots: Error Size Statistics |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
APPENDIX |
|
|
|
|
A. Twenty-One Machine Service Reports |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
INTRODUCTION
Some years ago, the
State of New Hampshire certified an optical scanning machine
for counting votes cast in special, primary and general
elections. The individual Towns and Cities decide whether to
count by hand or to purchase that machine. Those who decided
to purchase the machine have entered into a service and
maintenance contract with a single private company (LHS) who
programs the machines’ memory cards, using proprietary
software. Under the contract LHS also trains the municipal
employees, supplies the users with a programmed memory card
before each voting period, and responds to calls from local
election officials for assistance if a machine fails during a
voting period.
There are 324
precincts in New Hampshire. One hundred seventy seven (54.7%)
of the precincts use the state certified machine to count the
votes. One hundred forty seven (45.3%) count the votes by
hand. However, approximately 80% of all ballots (votes) cast
during a statewide Primary or General Election are counted by
machine. The balance are counted by hand.
New Hampshire held a
Presidential Primary on January 8, 2008. There were twenty one
Republican candidates and twenty Democrat candidates on the
ballot. All voters were given a paper ballot on which the
voter hand-marked his choice for President by filling in an
oval next to the candidate’s name.
Within days following
the Primary, Democrat candidate Denis Kucinich requested a
recount of the Democrat votes and Republican candidate Albert
Howard requested a recount of the Republican votes. The
Democrat recount was terminated by Kucinich after all the
ballots cast in Hillsborough County and approximately half the
ballots cast in Rockingham County were recounted by hand (only
about 40 percent of the Democrat ballots cast in the State
were recounted). The Republican recount ended in mid-February
after 100% of all ballots cast by Republicans were recounted
by hand.
With an interest in
defending the individual’s constitutionally guaranteed Right
to have and to know that his vote is being accurately
counted, this Foundation determined the New Hampshire recount
offered an excellent, real-world opportunity to independently
assess the statistical performance of optical scan, electronic
vote counting machines relative to hand counting of ballots.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Of the 347, 905 total
ballots processed during the recount 305,207 (87.7%) came from
towns and cities that use machines to count the votes, and
42,619 (12.3%) came from towns that use People to count the
votes.
New Hampshire’s vote
counting machines violate federal accuracy standards. New
Hampshire’s machines experienced an error rate approximately
163 times greater than the error rate allowed under federal
Election Law. In addition, the number of machine counts that
were in error by more than 2 votes was 9.81 times greater than
the number of hand counts that were off by more than 2 votes.
The number of machine counts that were in error by more than 1
vote was 3.37 times greater than the number of hand counts
that were off by more than 1 vote.
The probability that
an individual’s vote was accurately counted during the Primary
was much greater if his vote was counted by hand than by
machine.
Table 1
shows the results of the comparison of the performance of the
machines and the People who counted all the Republican ballots
cast statewide and all the Democrat ballots cast in
Hillsborough County and a large part of the ballots cast in
Rockingham County. The number of machine counts that were in
error by more than 2 votes was 9.81 times greater than the
number of hand counts that were off by more than 2 votes. The
number of machine counts that were in error by more than 1
vote was 3.37 times greater than the number of hand counts
that were off by more than 1 vote.
Table 2
compares the performance of the machines and the People who
counted only the Republican ballots cast statewide. The
number of machine counts that were in error by more than 2
votes was 6.93 times greater than the number of hand counts
that were off by more than 2 votes. The number of machine
counts that were in error by more than 1 vote was 3.13 times
greater than the number of hand counts that were off by more
than 1 vote.
Table 3
compares the performance of the machines and the People who
counted only the Democrat ballots cast in Hillsborough County
and a large part of Rockingham County. The number of machine
counts that were in error by more than 2 votes was 11.09 times
greater than the number of hand counts that were off by more
than 2 votes. The number of machine counts that were in error
by more than 1 vote was 2.7 times greater than the number of
hand counts that were off by more than 1 vote.
We identified 38
instances of apparent fraud where votes were being hand
counted.
We were not able to
determine if intentional or unintentional error was behind
the more substantial discrepancies in machine counts. Nor
were we able to determine the impact of the 21 machines that
failed on Primary Day, or if other machine failures occurred
but were not reported to the Secretary of State’s office.
In brief, the analysis
data supports the conclusion that not only are machine counts
of votes much more likely to result in error, but the machine
errors are of a significantly larger magnitude and variance
than those observed for hand counting.
RECOUNT PROCEDURE
The recount was
centralized at the State Archive Building located at 71 South
Fruit Street in Concord, NH. This means all ballots were
transported from each town and city hall to Concord.
The Secretary of State
made the decision not to start the Republican recount
until the Democrat recount had been completed. This meant as
each Ballot Box was opened in the recount room, the Republican
ballots had to be separated from the Democrat ballots. The
Republican ballots, including the absentee ballots, were
printed with a wide pink border at the top of the ballot. The
Democrat ballots, including the absentee ballots, had a wide
blue border at the top. During the Democrat recount, the
Republican ballots were placed in boxes, resealed and stored
for later count. Absentee Ballots were included in the
recount.
The ballots to be
counted were placed on one of eight tables. Taped on top of
each table were the names of the individual presidential
candidates. Two people hired by the State of NH as “Counters”
sat on one side of each table. Ballots were first segregated
by party. (Democrat ballots were not counted during the
Republican recount process.) Ballots were then separated by
candidate by the state “Counters” who allocated the votes cast
for each candidate into separate piles. Anomalies or
questionable votes were placed in a separate pile. On the
other side of the table sat one or more “Observers,” who were
representing either the candidate who called for the recount
or any other candidate on the ballot.
The anomalies were
reviewed by the Deputy Secretary of State, David Scanlon. He
made a judgment call regarding the intent of the voter. If the
observer agreed, the vote was counted. If the observer
disagreed, the vote was not counted, but was registered as a
“contested ballot,” for later determination by the Ballot Law
Commission, if necessary. There were approximately 25
contested ballots during the Republican recount.
Following resolution of anomalies, if any, the state Counters
twice tallied the count for each stack of candidate ballots by
counting each ballot by hand, twice.
The State’s Counters
entered the results of their count on Tally Sheets, certified
the results with their signatures, and then walked to the
front of the recount room where the Tally Sheets were handed
to Karen Ladd, the NH Director of Elections. She entered the
numbers in a master file – an Excel spreadsheet, for later
posting on the State’s website.
NOTE: This appeared to
be a tedious, tiresome, demanding task, subject to high risk
of “data entry error.” Ms. Ladd was working alone, without any
relief or any “verifier.” If an incorrect number was entered
into the master file, it could not be discovered absent
another statewide recount.
Soon after the start
of the Republican recount Secretary of State Bill Gardner
agreed to provide a copy of each Tally Sheet to candidate
Howard before the Tally Sheet was handed to Ms. Ladd. In
addition, Mr. Gardner agreed that at any time, in response to
any request by the candidate to do so, Ms. Ladd would copy the
developing, official, master recount file onto a “thumb drive”
or memory stick, dating each copy. This was done on four
separate days during the Republican recount.
ORIGINAL AND RECOUNT VOTE TOTALS
RECEIVED FROM NH SECRETARY OF STATE
Table 4 was obtained from the State of New Hampshire’s Secretary of
State. It shows the number of votes received by each
Republican Presidential candidate on Primary Day, as certified
by elected officials from the 324 Precincts, under penalty of
perjury. NOTE: The WTP Foundation added the column to the far
left to identify with an “H” the precincts that hand count the
votes.
Table 4 also shows the number of votes received by each Republican
Presidential candidate, as certified by the State’s Counters
during the recount (subject to any data entry errors by Ms.
Ladd).
Table 5
was also obtained from the State of New Hampshire’s Secretary
of State. It shows the votes received by each Democrat
Presidential candidate both on Primary Day and at the recount,
but only for Hillsborough County and that part of Rockingham
County that was included in the recount before Rep. Kucinch
stopped the Democrat recount. NOTE: The WTP Foundation added
the column to the far left to identify with an “H” the
precincts that hand count the votes.
OUR ASSUMPTIONS
A.
Hand v. Machine Count Precincts
We began our analysis of the data from
Table 4
and
Table 5,
(spreadsheets of the official results) by identifying
those Precincts that relied on machines to count the votes on
Primary Day and those that relied on People to do the
counting. The Assistant Deputy of State, Anthony Stevens
identified for us the towns that count votes by hand. We
cross-referenced his list with a page from the State’s website
that lists the towns and cities that count by machine.
B.
Write-Ins
Next, we eliminated the “write-ins.” Many Republican voters
wrote in the name of a Democrat as their choice for President,
and many Democrat voters wrote in the name of a Republican as
their choice for President.
NOTE: Republican candidate Howard paid for a state-wide
recount of all votes cast for Republicans. The Republican
recount did not include the write-in votes cast for
Republicans by Democrats on the Democrat ballots. The Democrat
recount was terminated after the ballots from Hillsborough and
part of Rockingham were counted (less than 40% of the Democrat
ballots that were cast on Primary Day).
Therefore, with the exception of all of Hillsborough County
and part of Rockingham County, we cannot know how many
Democrat voters intended to have their votes included in the
count for one of the Republican candidates.
However, a review of the Hillsborough and (partial) Rockingham
County Democrat ballot data shows 1297 Democrats cast votes
for Republicans.
See
Table 6. Table 6 also reveals a very large
discrepancy between those write-in votes as reported on
Election night and those counted during the recount. When
Secretary of State Bill Gardner was asked for his explanation
of the discrepancies he said the election officials overseeing
the vote in the precincts, “do not take the write- in votes
very seriously.”
C. "Double-Zeros"
Next, we eliminated the “double zeros” from our analysis. If
there was no vote cast for a particular candidate on Primary
Day (i.e., none was reported by the precinct officials and
none was reported by the counters and observers at the
recount), then no machine or people were called upon to count
anything and therefore, there is no data to be analyzed. That
is, only vote counts where either the original count or the
recount contained a non-zero result were included in this
analysis.
D.
Machine Failures and LHS Service Reports
During the recount we asked the
Secretary of State for reports of machine
failures on Primary Day. We were told
the Secretary of State learned on Primary Day that machines
had failed, that on Primary Day he asked LHS for a report of
the failures and that LHS had faxed twenty-one (21) Service
Reports.
The Secretary of State could not admit
or deny that those twenty-one LHS reports covered all the
machine failures in New Hampshire on Primary Day.
We were told we could apply, under the
State’s Right to Know Law for copies of the LHS Reports that
were received by the Secretary of State. We did so. A copy of
our request and the State’s reply, including copies of the
twenty-one Service Reports is included as
Appendix A
hereto.
While the impact of the machine
failures probably had a significant adverse impact on the vote
counting performance of machines in NH during Primary Day
(ballots not counted, voters who left the polling station
because they could not wait for the machine to be fixed,
electronic counters being set back, memory cards “re-burned”
or switched, machines swaps, etc.) we did not have any
additional information beyond the limited information shown on
the LHS Service Reports and, thus, we were not able to factor
into our analysis the impact of any specific reported machine
failure. It is quite possible that there were other machine
failures that were not reported to the Secretary of State
following the Primary.
E. Fraud
Next, we identified and removed from the analysis 38 hand
counts with discrepancies that could reasonably and fairly
characterized as the result of fraud. An example was the
redistribution to candidate Tancredo of all five votes cast
for candidate Fred Thompson in the Center Harbor Precinct in
Carroll County. Another example was the failure of the
counters to give Fred Thompson any of the votes he received in
the Precinct of Effingham in the County of Carroll. Another
example was the failure of the counters to give candidate
Giuliani any of the ten votes he received in the Second
College Precinct in Coos County.
We found we did not have enough information about any of the
machine discrepancies to specifically attribute those
discrepancies to unintentional or intentional (fraudulent)
error. The machines, themselves, failed to count properly or
election officials erred in handling and reporting the results
of the machine counts. The source of the error and whether or
not the error was intentional is not clear from the
information at hand. Regardless, as the data indicate, machine
counted precincts were far more likely to experience errors,
and the magnitude of those machine errors was far greater than
that observed for hand-counted precincts.
Confusion and Frustration:
missing Memory
Cards,
Uncast Ballots,
Chain of Custody and
Voter Registration data
None of the machine memory cards were
transported to Concord along with the ballots for the recount.
When asked, the Secretary of State could he did not know what
happened to the 177 memory cards associated with the machines
used to count the votes in the 177 precincts that count by
machine. He said they cost the towns about $250 each and could
have been retained by the municipality or removed by LHS to be
reprogrammed for the next election.
In addition, the Secretary of State
refused to tell candidate Howard how many ballots were printed
and how many were delivered to each municipality. When asked
if the State or municipalities were required to account for
the “uncast ballots” he said, “No.” When asked if the
municipalities were required to include all uncast ballots
with the cast ballots for transport to Concord he said, “No.”
When asked by candidate Howard to include a count of the
uncast ballots during the recount, the Secretary of State
refused to do so, saying the law required that he count only
the cast ballots during a recount. When asked if he could
explain the obvious discrepancies between the number of uncast
ballots the towns indicated were included in the boxes and the
number actually included, he said he could not.
Copies of the precinct poll books were
not included with the material transported to Concord for the
recount. Thus it was not possible to determine if the number
of people who showed up and registered to vote on Primary Day
matched the number of votes reported by the State as having
been cast.
There was considerable concern on the
part of People associated with candidate Howard and/or the
recount about the lack of accountability of the machine memory
cards, the uncast ballots and the poll books, especially in
light of what was obviously a less than adequate chain of
custody of the ballots between election night and the actual
recount of those ballots in Concord.
Candidate Howard expressed deep concern
that a scenario of fraud similar to the following had been
made possible by the failure to fully account for un-cast
ballots: First, a machine memory card(s) might have been
programmed to take a set amount of votes (say, for example 50
votes) away from candidate A and to give them to candidate B.
Upon the news of the recount, those responsible for using the
rigged memory cards had to access the ballots to make them
match the machine totals. 50 uncast ballots were
then marked for candidate B and placed with the rest of the
ballots cast in that town, while 50 votes for candidate A were
removed from the box of ballots for that town.
OUR FINDINGS
A.
NH Machine Errors Violate Federal
Law By A Wide Margin
The federal
Help America Vote Act, or HAVA, requires that states certify
that their electronic voting systems to meet federal vote
counting accuracy standards.
New Hampshire’s voting machines appear to violate federal
accuracy standards by grossly unacceptable levels.
Below are two excerpts from federal election law. The first
citation makes clear that HAVA requires states to meet
standards established by the Federal Election Commission. The
second citation establishes the specific accuracy requirement.
Help America Vote Act of 2002, Public
Law 107-252
SEC. 301. <<NOTE: 42 USC 15481.>> VOTING SYSTEMS STANDARDS
(a) Requirements.--Each voting system used in an election for
Federal office shall meet the following requirements:
[omitted]
(5) Error rates.--The error rate of the voting system in counting ballots (determined by taking into
account only those errors which are attributable to the voting system and not attributable to an
act of the voter) shall comply with the error rate standards established under section 3.2.1
of the voting systems standards issued by the Federal Election Commission.
[emphasis added]
2002 FEC Voting System Standards, Volume 1
3.2.1 Accuracy Requirements
Voting system accuracy addresses the
accuracy of data for each of the individual ballot positions
that could be selected by a voter, including the positions
that are not selected. For a voting system, accuracy is
defined as the ability of the system to capture, record,
store, consolidate and report the specific selections and
absence of selections, made by the voter for each ballot
position without error. Required accuracy is defined in terms
of an error rate that for testing purposes represents the
maximum number of errors allowed while processing a specified
volume of data. This rate is set at a sufficiently stringent
level such that the likelihood of voting system errors
affecting the outcome of an election is exceptionally remote
even in the closest of elections.
The error rate is defined using a
convention that recognizes differences in how vote data is
processed by different types of voting systems. Paper-based
and DRE systems have different processing steps. Some
differences also exist between precinct count and central
count systems. Therefore, the acceptable error rate applies
separately and distinctly to each of the following functions:
a. For all paper-based systems:
1) Scanning ballot positions on paper ballots to
detect selections for individual
candidates and contests;
2) Conversion of selections detected on paper ballots into
digital data;
[…omitted]
For testing purposes, the acceptable error rate is defined
using two parameters: the desired error rate to be achieved,
and the maximum error rate that should be accepted by the test
process.
For each processing function indicated above, the system
shall achieve a target error rate of no more than one in
10,000,000 ballot positions, with a maximum acceptable error
rate in the test process of one in 500,000 ballot positions.
[emphasis added]
In the 2008 NH Primary
recount a total of 347,905 votes total were processed
during the recount. This includes all Republican ballots from
the entire state and Democrat ballots from just two of NH’s
counties.
Of the 347,905 total
ballots counted during the recount 305,286 came from
machine-counted precincts/towns, while 42,619 came from
hand-counted precincts/towns.
To determine the
number of ballot “positions” for the following accuracy
compliance analysis, it was assumed that 21 “positions”
(candidates) per paper ballot existed. Multiplying
305,286 by 21 yields 6,411,006 possible ballot
positions.
According to the HAVA/FEC
standards cited above, the maximum
machine error rate allowed by law is (1) one error per
500,000 positions.
To calculate the nominal number of errors that might have been
allowed under federal law for the votes analyzed as part of
the recount, we divided 6,411,006 by 500,000, resulting in a
maximum number of 12.8 machine count errors allowed
by law.
That is, IF the
NH electronic voting machines met federal FEC accuracy
standards,
NH should not have detected any more than (13) thirteen
votes in error in the paper ballot population analyzed in the
recount.
Unfortunately, by
comparing the officially certified machine-counted vote counts
against the hand-counts performed as part of the
recount process, the WTP analysis documented 2,090
separate, individual machine-counted voter ballots in
error.
This means that for the 347,905 separate voter ballots
analyzed as part of the 2008 Primary recount process,
New Hampshire experienced error rates for their
machine-counted votes approximately 163 times greater than the
machine count error rate allowed under U.S. election law
(2,090 machine errors found vs. 12.8 machine errors allowed =
163 times greater).
The WTP analysis
further shows that even if every single machine-counted error
greater than one (1) vote in size was simply ignored (i.e.,
1682 errors), New Hampshire’s machine-count error rate
would still have been calculated at over 31 times the machine
error rate allowed under federal law. (408 ballot
errors vs. 12.8 allowed by law)
This startling, but
well documented finding should compel serious consideration
toward decertifying New Hampshire’s electronic vote counting
machines.
B.
Hand Counting Virtually Assures All Votes
Will Be Accurately Counted
The probability that
an individual’s vote was accurately counted during the Primary
was much greater if his vote was counted by hand than by
machine.
The error rate of
machine counts was more than one and one-half times greater
than the error rate of hand counts. The number of machine
counts that were in error by more than 2 votes was 9.81
times greater than the number of hand counts that were off
by more than 2 votes. The number of machine counts that were
in error by more than 1 vote was 3.37 times greater than the
number of hand counts that were off by more than 1 vote. See
Tables 1-3 and 7-10.
When the much higher frequency of machine-counted errors is
coupled with the statistically disturbing magnitude of the
machine errors, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the
use of optical scan machines to count votes has robbed many
citizens of New Hampshire of their Right to Vote and their
Right to have their Vote counted accurately.
Our analysis of the state’s data and election practices
suggest that there are numerous steps that the government of
New Hampshire can take to bolster the integrity of its
election process - whether votes are counted by hand or by
machine. Although hand-counting of votes is clearly not yet a
perfected art, in keeping alive the practice of hand-counting,
New Hampshire has served its citizens well. Beyond this, the
state should not subject its People to further enduring
electronic voting machines that grossly fail to meet even the
minimal accuracy standards mandated by federal law.
We hope our analysis has provided some much needed light onto
a matter that substantially affects the future of freedom in
New Hampshire - and our entire Republic.
Robert L. Schulz
Chairman
We The People Foundation
2458 Ridge Road
Queensbury, NY 12804
Bob@givemeliberty.org |